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PREFACE 
International commodity agreements have been adopted for several 
commodities involved in world trade. The most notable are the tin, wheat, 
sugar, cocoa, tea. and coffee schemes. Because of the variety of char-
acteristics associated with the trade of each product, each scheme differs. 
However. commodity agreements share many common traits.· Nearly 
always the agreements are some fonn of stabilization scheme. And since 
the existence of a commodity agreement by definition infers that arti• 
ficial forces are used to supplant the usual operation of the market, 
these agreements have many common problems. Experience indicates that 
compliance and coordination of price policies between economic require• 
ments and equity considerations are two issues prone to lead to diffi-
culties. 
On th-e basis of the similarity noted above, a group of problems 
commonly associated with commodity agreements in general has been 
selected. The study then undertakes to evaluate the scope and provisions 
of the International Coffee Agreement of 1962 in the framework of these 
genera 1 problems,. 
Indebtedness is acknowledged to Dr. Rudolph Trenton for his. guidance 
and assistance in this study. His suggestions improved greatly both the 
substance and the form of the thesis. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
The Set ting of the Coffee Problem 
Coffee connands a position that is significant both in world trade 
and 1n the aspirations of over a dozen Latin American and African nations 
with respect to their capability to achieve economic growth and develop-
ment. The proportion of the value of world coffee exports to world output 
of coffee 1s among the highest of all agricultural corrmodities involved 
1n international trade. Moreover, the production of coffee is of pre-
dominant importance in the national economi sofa number of countries as 
a source of foreign exchange. Brazil, Columbia, El Salvador, Ethiopia, and 
Guatemala are d pendent upon coffee exports for one-half to two-thirds of 
their foreign exchange. Consequently, to the extent that these and other 
coffee producing countries have to depend upon imports for the execution 
of their plans for economic development, the rol of coffee in world trade 
1s important. 
For the greater part of this century, the coffee trade has undergone 
numerous crises. Prices have fluctuated violently causing problems for 
consllllers and producers alike. The brunt of these fluctuations has been 
particularly troublesome for producers. Drops in earnings have carried 
disastrous effects to those producer countries that depend heav1 ly on 
1 
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coffee as a source of income and foreign exchange. 
In the past, producers have tried numerous schemes to alleviate 
the hardships and disruptions caused by violent price fluctuations. The 
success of these schemes has been varied. Recently efforts to remedy 
the coffee problem have been undertaken in the fonn of international agree-
ments to control coffee exports in an attempt to stabilize and maintain 
coffee prices. The latest of these agreements was the International Coffee 
Agreement which was provisionally adopted in the United Nations Conference 
of 1962 and became effective in 1963. It is the task of. this study to 
evaluate that Agreement in terms of its effect on the coffee trade and its 
chances for successful long-term operation. 
Objectives of the Study 
The International Coffee Agreement is a complex, multipurpose arrange-
ment. Thus it did not conveniently lend itself to evaluation on the basis 
of a singular criterion. The Agreement could, for exa~ple, {and is by 
certain parties) be viewed primarily as a device enabling the producer 
countries to deal with their foreign exchange problems. Some see the 
International Coffee Agreement and other related commodity agreements 
as instrumental in correcting alleged unfavorable and unjustified tenns 
of trade imposed upon underdeveloped countries relying on only one or a 
few primary commodities as their main exports. Or it may be that the 
Agreement is viewed as a convenient device for extracting funds from 
the developed consumer nations to aid the less fortunate underdeveloped 
coffee producing countries.l 
1The tenn convenient is used because, particularly in the instance of 
the United States, the donating consumers would be less aware of the amount 
However, this study did not attempt to evaluate the International 
Coffee Agreement in terms of these broader issues. Rather the subject 
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was confined to considering the Agreement as a possible corrective device 
to ameliorate the problems of a commodity trade plagued by imbalance and 
unstable prices. It has been argued that inherent supply and demand 
conditions of the coffee trade make inevitable a degree of price insta-
bility. It was an underlying assumption of the study that greater price 
stability would be desirable. The study proceeded to assess the scope and 
provisions of the International Coffee Agreement, and the manner in which 
these have been employed. An attempt was made to determine if the Agreement 
has and will continue to bring about greater price and output stability in 
the world coffee market. 
Organization of the Study 
The study of the International Coffee Agreement and the world coffee 
market covers two phases. The first part of the study deals with the 
behavior of the coffee trade and examines such basic economic factors in 
the trade as supply and demand conditions. 
The second part of the paper is devoted to an evaluation of the 
scope and operation of the International Coffee Agreement. The experience 
of past schemes has been examined for lessons that may be relevant to the 
Agreement. Following this the nature and provisions of the Agreement are 
summarized. Then the Agreement is assessed from the standpoint of prob-
lems commonly associated with such commodity schemes. Most of the dis-
cussion of the Agreement centers around its principal objective--price 
involved where it is hidden in the price of coffee than if the cost were 
publicized in an appropriation from the tax proceeds of their government, 
and thus there is less danger of them objecting. 
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stabilization. The varied aux1 liary aims of the Agreement are treated 
mainly to the extent that they rel ate to the issue of price stabilization. 
Definitions 
Con~ptio..!l 
It was impossible to find adequate data for total final consumption 
on a world Market basis. Subsequently, exports are used in the following 
discussion as an indication of consumption. 
Production 
---·---
For purposes .cf making crnnpeirisons between consur,ption and produc-
t1on, exportable production is the most desirable figure to quote. Export-
a.ble production represents toto.1 production minus consumption in the 
producer countries. Unfortunately, data for total production are used 
for the period before 19tl0 bGctwse exportable µreduction is not available. 
Prices 
·--
The price data quoted in following discussions refer to spot quota-
tions per pound of coffee ir. the :-1011r1 York Market for green coffee unless 
otherwise specified. It is customary in the trade to make reference to 
general coffee price trends by citing spot prices for Brazil Santos No. 4 
coffee. However, due to the variety of classifications and origins of 
the major commercial coffees. it is not always satisfactory to refer to a 
world price trend in this manner. l1Jhere divergent patterns necessitate 
attention, Santos No. 4, Columbian Hanizales, and native Uganda No. 10 
prices will be used to represent the relative prices of Brazils. Milds, 
and Robustas respectively. 
In discussions concerning the effect of prices on production, it must 
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be cautioned that growers' prices do not necessarily correspond with trends 
1n world market prices. Disparities might arise because typically pro-
ducer nations pay their growers prices that do not correspond to market 
prices. 
Time Periods 
Besides the calendar year, two other years are referred to in 
the text of this study--the "marketing year" and the "coffee year 11 • The 
"marketing year" runs from July 1 of one year to June 30 of the next. For 
example, the crop harvested in 1965 1s marketed between July 1, 1965, 
and June 30, .1966. In comparing production in the "marketing year" 
1965-66 with exports which are listed by calendar year, exports for 1966 
are used. The "coffee year" 1s the official year adopted by the Inter-
national Coffee Council and runs from October l through September 30 of 
the next calendar year. This period is referred to in discussions con-
cerning quota and other actions taken by the International Coffee Council. 
CHAPTER II 
THE FRAMEWORK OF THE WORLD COFFEE TRADE 
This chapter focuses on material concerning the nature of the 
world coffee trade. First the geography of coffee production and the 
major classifications of commercial coffee are sketched. Market factors 
with supply, demand, and price data plus an examination of causal 
factors shaping the coffee trade will follow.. 
Location and Importance of Producers 
Since coffee first became a popular beverage in seventeenth-
century Europe, the center of coffee production has shifted several 
times. First Arabia, then the West Indies, and later Java took their 
respective turns as the principal world producers. In our own century 
Brazil has consistently been the largest coffee producing nation, and 
together with the rest of Latin America. the bulk. of coffee production 
has been concentrated in the Western Hemisphere. Africa and Asia 
constitute the coffee growing areas in the Eastern Hemisphere, and 
Africa is by far the more important of the two continents. 
Brazi Ps output has on occasion reached three quarters of aggregate 
world production in this century. In more recent years, however, three-
fifths to two-fifths would be a more accurate statement of BraziPs relative 
share of total production.. Over a long run period of thi.rty .. five years, 
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Brazil has shown a relative decline as a world producer. Part of this 
has been accounted for by increases elsewhere in the Western Hemisphere. 
Howe v· r, more recently there seems to be a general tendency for the 
Eastern Hemisphere, and in particular Africa, to increase its relative 
share of coffee output. In he past decade, for example, the coffee 
producing countries of the wes tern Hemisphere increased their exportable 
crop by 29 percent, while those of the Eastern Hemisphere increased 
7 
theirs by 136 percent. For Africa alone the growth rate was 12d percent.2 
The relative share of the two hemispheres was 78-22 percent in the first 
year of the period (1954-1964) and 66-34 in the last year. This com-
pari·son indicates a considerable change in relative shares, but i t 
obscures the operation of wide fluctuations in the intervening years. 
As an example, the coffee producing countries of the Western Hemisphere 
accounted for almost 80 percent of the world total in 1959-1960. 
Classification and Characteristics 
of t he Major Commercial Coffees 
The genus coffea can be b~oken down into some forty species, but 
only three are of conunercial importance: arabica, robusta, and liberica. 
Historically arabicas have accounted for the greater part of world pro-
duction, but recently the demand for robustas has increased as they are 
particularly adaptable for blending in soluble coffee. 
It is a con111on practice in the trade to speak of coffee as falling 
2Pan American Coffee Bureau, Annual Coffee Statistics, 1963: No . 27 
(New York, 1964), p. 16. 
into two broad categories, Brazils and Milds. This classification can 
cause considerable confusion as it overlaps the species. Brazils are 
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all varieties of coffee produced in Brazil and are of the arabica species. 
Milds are all other coffees grown outside of Brazil and thus include 
arabicas, robustas, and liberica. Traders generally regard Brazils as 
11 price 11 coffees and Milds as the 11 qua lity grades '1 • 3 That is to say Milds 
c::immonly offer Brazilian coffee competition in terms of quality not 
price. However, this is not by any means categorical. For instance, 
African robus~as are generally classed inferior to 3razil 1 s in terms of 
flavor and typi.cally sell for less. 
Coffee is further divided for corrrnercial purposes into a myriad 
of kinds and grades. For instance, Brazil coffees are classified into 
five groups, which are named after the ports from which they are shipped: 
Santos, Rio, Victoria, Bahia, and Paranagria. 4 These groups are further 
subdivided according to their bean characteristics and districts ·in 
which they are grown. Then the different types as to species, variety, 
and origin are graded as naturals, unwashed, soft, and hard. 
Historical Trends in the 
World Coffee Market 
Figures l and 2 provide a composite picture of factors in the world 
coffee trade since 1900. Total world exportable production and exports 
are shown in Figure l and in Appendix A. Exports are shown rather than 
actual final consumption because the latter was not available. Hov1ever, 
3L~illiam H. Ukers~ P,n About Coffee (NevJ York, 1935}, p. 198. 
4Ibid. 
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this may be just as well because this study is interested in the immediate 
factors that bear on the international aspects of the coffee trade . 
Three sets of prices represent the three major classifications of coffee 
in the trade as quoted in New York. Santos represents the Brazilian 
variety of arabica and Manizales the mild varieties of arabica. Native 
Uganda price data are used to represent the African robusta coffees. 
Si nce the three prices show a common historical trend (see Appendix C-1), 
reference is made to Santos prices as the average world coffee price in 
Figure 2. The most notable aspects of the period are the historical 
fluctuations in coffee production, the frequent and serious periods of 
surpluses, and the erratic behavior of coffee prices. 
The data in Figures l and 2 along with Appendixes A, B, and C will 
also be referred to in the remainder of the chapter which deals in 
detail with the factors noted above. 
An Economic Appraisal of Coffee Production 
Coffee production is subject to numerous erratic influences. Due 
to the botani cal nature of the coffee tree, it is natural for crop yields 
to vary from one year to the next . The vagari es of the weather and the 
geographical structure of the coffee producing industry also present 
underlying tendencies towards instability. These factors explain the 
extremely volatile nature of coffee output which led V. D. Wickizer to 
make the following statement: "Unquestionably the characteristic of great-
est significance throughout the modern economic history of coffee has been 
the variability of supply. 115 The extreme variations in coffee supplies 
5v. D. Wickizer, The World Coffee Economy With Special Reference To 
Control Schemes {Stanford, 1943), p. 109. 
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are important because of the implication for world coffee prices. 
World output of coffee is subject to extreme and continued fluc-
tuations. The truth of this statement is vividly portrayed in the 
graphs in Figures land 3. It is further evident from Figure 3 that 
the source of much of the instability in world coffee production stems 
from Brazil. Not only does Brazil represent a large portion of world 
production, but it also is most vulnerable to weather influences. A 
great share of its output comes from Sao Paulo which is in a temperate 
zone where frosts and droughts occur even more frequently than in the 
tropical climates of other producing areas. 
Generally speaking, two discernible cycles seem to manifest the 
variable behavior of coffee output. An examination of these cycles 
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will shed further light upon the behavior of coffee production, and in 
addition, reveal some of the basic factors that account for this behavior. 
The first cycle is referred to simply as the 11 two year" cycle (see 
Figure 3). This cycle could be described as an intrinsic factor in the 
·Variable behavior of coffee production as it stems from the physiological 
nature of the coffee tree. The occurrence of the "two year" cycle, a 
good year following a bad year and a bad year following a good year, is 
common to other tree crops as well a~ coffee. Wickizer attributes this 
cycle 11 ••• mainly to the fact that a heavy yield so depletes the yielding 
power of the tree ••• that even very favorable weather conditions fail to 
offset this, until a light crop has enabled the tree to replenish its 
reserves. 116 
In a study undertaken by the Federal Trade Conmission in 1954 per-
taining to the utwo year" cycle in Brazil the following results were 
6w1ckizer, p. 112. 
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found. 7 Between lB82 .. g3 and 1940-iH production tnd 58 opportunities to 
e·fther continue its samti direction 0r reverse its cour~/~ as coo1pared with 
the previous year. Production changed its l'lirection on 38 occasions or 
nearly two-thirds of the total. The existence of the cycle was also 
observed 1n other areas. £xceptfons to the ·two year span of the cycle 
w1Jre fout1d to have been usually of short duration and were explained as 
occurring because of the vagaries of the weather which caused poor 
crops to be harvested in more than one successive year. In recent years 
the cyc1e is manifested most clearly in the 1954-55 and 1960-61 
upturns in Brazn•s production (see Figure 3). 
As a consequence of the 11 two year'' production cycle, it 1s common 
for the price of coffee to increase one year and decline the next (see 
r19urc 2). 
However. the ramifications of the ''two year'' production cycle on 
coffee growers 1s not as serious as the other cycle which will now be 
treated. For convenienc¢ this production c;yc1e will be referred to as 
the 11 1ong term" cycle because it is longer in duration. 8 
Figure 4 which shows production and prices wf 11 be referred to 
in order to portray the 0 long termn cycle. The data have been plotted 
from two year moving averages to eliminate the "two year0 cycle described 
above and clarify the ulong term" cycle. Price is shown on a two year 
average basis because the interact.ion of the two is ill'lflortant. 
Two long term cycle$ ca.n be observed in Figure 4. The first 
7Federa1 Trade Commission. Economic Re..e.ort of the InvestigatJ.011. of 
£,Qff..~e Prices (Washington, 1954), p. 21. 
8on the same FTC study referred to above, mention was made of a 
11perfodic1* cycle which usually lasted about seven years. However., such 
a. cycle does not seem readily apparent sf nee World Har I I (see Chart IV) 
and therefore is not discussed. 
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started in the early twenties and began to taper off at the end of the 
thirties. The second cycle that will be referred to is the one that 
began in the late forties and apparently is still in continuation. 
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It is important to notice the behavior of prices during the course 
of these production cycles. In both instances substantial price increases 
occurred at the beginning of the cycle. The chart seems to suggest 
that price plays a major role in precipitating the "long tenn" cycle. 
It is also notable that substantial lags occur between the bulk of the 
price hike and much of the expansion in output. In addition. production 
has in both instances continued to expand long after prices have dropped 
off drastically. 
A study of the time lag between price increases and production was 
undertaken by Henry Hopp on the basis of Brazil's experience from 1872 
to 1953.9 He found that the lag varied in length from 2 years to 10 
years. Although a mean lag of 4.7 years was computed. it does not lend 
itself to generalization because there is so much variation in the lag. 
The reaction of production to price will vary in time and extent 
because many other factors enter into the picture. It was pointed out 
in the same study noted above that: 
Increased prices can have a fairly quick effect on production 
when run-down plantations are rejuvenated; the effect will be 
much slower when increased prices stimulate planting activity. 
Furthermore. planters' judgment as to continuation of 
favorable business conditions must certainly affect the lag 
period. In addition. irregularity in bearing makes it difficult 
to estimate the lag accuratelyi yield increases may come several 
9Henry Hopp. •supply and Demand in Relation to the Price of Coffee•. 
Foreign Agriculture Circular. F.C.B. 30-54 (16 Oec •• 1954) U.S. Depart-
ment of Agriculture, Washington, o.c •• pp. 13-17. 
years sooner or later than would be expected purel10from the 
effect of price rises on the response of planters. 
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Factors shaping the reaction of production to price declines include the 
alternative uses and profitability of land and capital resources in con-
junction with various factors affecting the costs of continued cultivation 
and harvesting of the coffee trees . 11 Reaction also, in part, could 
depend upon the business conditions existent in consuming countries. The 
combined effect of increasing income and declining prices could plausibly 
stimulate purchases sufficiently to keep continued cultivation profitable. 
Finally, government efforts to subsidize producers• incomes through various 
programs will bear on the reaction of production to a decline in world 
prices for coffee. 
Much of the behavior of toddct ion and prices above can again be 
traced to the nature of the coffee tree. Generally speaking, trees begin 
to yield fruit 2 to 4 years if planted as seedlings, and 4 to 5 years if 
planted from seeds. Moreover, yields become heavier as the trees mature. 
Usually the increase in yield continues for roughly 10 years out of a 
15 to 30 year productive life span. This would appear to go a long way 
in explaining why production continues to increase even after prices have 
fallen off. 
The behavior of prices following increased production (see Figure 4) 
and the surplus of exportable production over requirements {see Figure 1) 
during the two "long tenn" cycles noted seem to justify the statement tlsat 
producers overreact to initial price increases. Explanations for this 
lOHenry Hopp, p. 15. 
lllbid., p. 15. 
phenomenon are implied in the discussion above. The time lag between 
planting and yielding makes it difficult for producers to anticipate 
the proper reaction to prices. The fact that prices are allowed to 
climb for some time before increased output is realized may mean there 
is a natural tendency for planters to overplant. On top of this there 
are large numbers of planters, and in such an atomistic structure each 
planter will typically fail to anticipate the effect of his increased 
plantings on future prices. 
Thus the factors shaping the output of coffee seem to point to an 
inherent tendency for coffee production to promote instability in the 
coffee trade. 
An Economic Appraisal of Coffee Consumption 
The Past Behavior of Coffee Consumption 
It has been noted in the preceding section that coffee production 
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has historically been subject to tremendous irregularity. Figure 1 
indicates that total world consumption12 has followed a much more stable 
course from year to year. The largest fluctuation in production from 
one year to the next (1930-31) to ever occur amounted to about 30% of 
the previous year's output. On the other hand the largest ·peacetime 
fluctuation in consumption ever recorded (1931-32) was 19% of the previous 
year's consumption. In the past decade production and consumption both 
experienced their largest fluctuation from 1958-1960 (see Figure 1). The 
12Total world consumption is indicated by exports here and thus fails 
to include domestic consumption. Consequently, the years beginning i.n 
1946 lend themselves to comparison better than earlier years because the 
production figures in this period are adjusted to production available for 
export. 
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magnitude of increase in output represented roughly 31% over a two year 
span as compared to an 18% increase in consumption. It is also significant 
that while a gradual growth in consumption has occurred in the long run 
with few interruptions, production has grown much more rapidly. This 
behavior 1s central in explaining the volatile movement of prices in 
past years as it points to the source of imbalance in the coffee trade. 
Consumer Reaction to Price Changes 
It is conmonly observed that .moderate changes in the price of coffee 
produce slight changes in consumption in the short run. Wh ile this 
statement may be less true for trade demand than consumer demand the 
latter eventually circumscribes the former in shaping coffee prices. This 
is primarily the case because, in light of the expense of storing coffee, 
roasters cannot afford to hold large stocks of coffee indefinitely. 
Empirical studies on the subject have generally corroborated the notion 
that consumption typically responds to price changes in a very limited 
manner. 13 While the demand for coffee seems to be relatively inelastic 
in response to price fluctuations caused by crop variations, the statement 
must be qualified. If price trends continue for some time, consumption 
eventually becomes more responsive to price changes. Moreover, con-
sumption appears to be more responsive to price changes at high levels 
than at low levels . This was particularly the case during the mid-fifties. 
Many factors can be presented to explain why coffee consumption is 
relatively inelastic with respect to price in the short run. The most 
frequently cited explanation is that coffee drinking is general ly a habit 
13F.A.O., The World Coffee Economy, Commodity Bulletin, Series No. 33 
(Rome, 1961), p. 30. 
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and it takes time for habits to change. 14 The habit may partially be 
derived from the drink's distinctive taste and certain of its ingredients 
that give it a stimulative property. Two other factors that lend 
tenacity to the coffee drinking habit aresocial custom and a lack of 
reasonably close substitutes. Particularly this is true in the United 
States where direct substitutes are a negligible factor on the level 
of coffee cons:umption. However, in continental Europe chicory, malted 
cereals, and dried figs are frequently used as substitutes for coffee.15 
Thus the price elasticity of coffee may be expected to be somewhat 
greater in that area. Tea, and to a lesser extent, other drinks may 
also be considered as substitutes. However, the coffee habit greatly 
restricts movements to these alternatives. ~Jater, in a sense, is a 
substitute for coffee as its proportion can be varied. It would seem 
plausible that at high prices the practice of diluting coffee with water 
may be especially significant. However, this statement is merely con-
jectural for no studies on the subject have been found. 
In surrmary, the evidence seems to point towards the conclusion 
that coffee consumption is relat'lvely inelastic with respect to price. 
This, however, is a general statement~ and it may be ·important that 
modifications be made for areas where per capita consumption of coffee 
is low. Also this statement appears to be more evident in the short run 
than over longer run periods in which time habits have had an opportunity 
to change. 
14v. D. Wickizer, The World Coffee Economy, pp. 46-63. 
15F .A.O., The Hor·! d Coffee Economy, p. 33. 
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The Behavior of Coffee Prices and Earnings 
In the preceding pages the major theme that seems to develop 1s 
that the basic coffee problem can be derived directly from the fundamental 
nature of the supply and demand for coffee. In the eyes of the producer 
countries, the most direct evidence of this problem is the behavior of 
prices and total earnings received from coffee. 
In the absence of any effective control scheme, coffee prices have 
historically been subject to fluctuations of considerable amplitude. 
For example, prices in 1955 were over four times as high as those in 1945. 
Five years later prices had descended to about half their 1954-55 peak 
(see Figure 2). 
In tracing the coffee cycle it has been noted that an initial 
price increase tends to be very stimulative with respect to production. 
However, due to a time lag involved, before the full force of increased 
production is realized prices have already begun to fall. As the trees 
reach maturity the yield continues to increase and depress prices further. 
Moreover, since historically the consumption of coffee does not increase 
appreciably when a price decrease occurs, little outlet for the pressure 
upon prices can be expected from that side of the market. 
By examining Table I the implications and magnitude of a drop in 
price following increased output can be understood more fully. Table I 
lists total exports and total earnings of the world's coffee producers 
during the period from 1957 to 1962 when increasing production and falling 
prices were witnessed. With the exception of 1958, exports of coffee 
expanded during this period, but not enough to prevent a decline in the 
total value of earnings to the world coffee producers. With minor 
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exceptions this trend is representative of most of the individual 
producers' experience as well. It is not difficult to see why producers 
Year 
1957 
1958 
1959 
1960 
1961 
1962 
Table I 
~JORLD COFFEE EXPORT EARNINGS, 1957-62 
Price Per M.T. Total Exports 
U.S.$ 1,000 M.T. 
1033 2239 
916- 2194 
750 2600 
700 2632 
678 2716 
663 2773 
Computed Value 
Mi 11 ion U. S. $ 
2313 
2010-
1950 
1842 
1841 
1839 
Source: F.A.O., Trade Yearbook, Vols. XI-XVII, Rome, 1957-63. 
become alarmed when production rises. 
The set of circumstances thus described has frequently occurred 
in the history of coffee and has in particular been the main feature of 
the postwar years that has led to the recent International Coffee Agree-
ment. But while imbalance in the coffee trade is typically characterized 
by excess supplies and falling prices, there have been times when shortages 
of coffee have led to equally extreme upward trends in prices such as in 
the 1953-55 period. 
In conclusion, this chapter has illustrated that instability in the 
coffee trade is due largely to the inherent nature of the supply and 
demand for the product. Therefore, it is not difficult to understand why 
producer countries look towards artificial controls as a means of stabilizing 
the price of coffee. 
CHAPTt.H III 
HISTORY OF COFFEE CONTROL SCHEMES TO 1962 
In Chapter II 1t beciime clear that, dti~ to the inherent nature 
of the supply and demand for coffee and the location and concentration 
of coffee production geographically, instability is the t:xpected norm 
for the coffee trade. The subject next turns to the general issue of 
whether or not artificial contro1slfi can uir;eliora.tei this condition. 
A reyi e,; of the coffee trade I s past experience in cor1tro 1 is va 1 uab le 
from the standpoint that further perspective on the question is obtained. 
The coffee trttde has been subject to artificial controls for a 
longer period than any other commodity of world importance.17 Controls 
of mariy types have been exercised by the producing countries since about 
1905. They include production controh, controls over the movement of 
coffee to and 'from ~1orts, credit controls, export price controls, and 
controls over the for~ign exchang,a derived from coffee sales. 
This pa.st and present use of a multitude of unilateral controls adds 
to the complex nature of evaluating the effect of an international control 
l61n the body of this pap(;1r artificial controls, or simply controls, 
will be used as a general expression encompassing any attempt to affect 
the natural course of market condit.lons. Thi.s includes any scheme 
organized or authorized by a govarm:.1ental unit of any level but not 
private cartel efforts. 
11wic:kizer. Jbe World Coffee Econori!i:_, p. 136. 
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scheme on production and prices. For example, a producer country can 
pursue independent pricing programs. Thus~ it is difficult to establish 
directly that an international scheme that succeeds in increasing 
prices excessively will ultimately Dring its own house down because 
production will over-respond. The individual producer governments may 
be paying lower prices to their growers so that the domestic prices will 
not overstimulate production. Or conversE'=lY internal price supports may 
conceivably lead to excessive production even if world prices are quite 
low. 
To go into detail about the development of coffee controls is too 
large a task here. Subsequently, the discussion is confined to a summary 
of cases and types of controls which are felt to hav12: particular relevance 
to issues that pertain to the International Coffee Agreement. 
Brazilian Control Schemes 
Prior to World War I, the principal control schemes over coffee 
were initiated in Brazil. During the years 1905-1909 a policy of pur-
chasing coffee for storage in conjunction with restricting new plantings 
was instituted to maintain coffee prices. This was Brazil's first 
valorization program in a series of three such schemes which were in 
operation at various phases of time from 1905-1923. 
A study undertaken by the Brookings Institution concluded that: 
The first valorization and the restrictive measures which 
accompanied it prevented a severe fall in;prices in 1906-07 
and enabled the Committee conducting the operations to main-
tain an artificial price during the years 19109 1911, and 
1912 higher than that which the 'statistical position•18 of 
18sy working surplus supplies of coffee off gradually from 1905-1918 
prices climbed somewhat in spite of the excess supplies accumulated from 
1905-1909. 
coffee seemed to justify. 19 
Similar programs were followed in 1915-18 and 1920-21. While 
these two valorization schemes proved less able to maintain prices, 
they at least appeared to be somewhat successful in moderating extreme 
price fluctuations. 20 
Up to this time controls had been envisioned as temporary measures 
for emergency situations. However, a permanent coffee defense policy 
was adopted in 1922. Essentially the program consisted of setting up 
public warehouses, regulating the movement of coffee from the interior 
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to seaports and regulating the release of coffee for export. Coffee 
prices held a healthy level until 1925, but, according to Virgil Salera, 
several problems were incurred too. 11 Consumpt1on expanded more slowly, 
high coffee earnings tended to overencourage production, and non-Brazilian 
output got a big boost. 21 The depression of 1930 added to the compli-
cations and caused the collapse of the plan. 
After 1930 the main feature of Brazil's program was the systematic 
destruction of coffee and the levying of prohibitions on new plantings. 
During the 1930 1 s Brazil destroyed nearly 100 million bags of coffee. 
In order to evaluate the results of Brazil's control schemes from 
1905-1939 Santos 4 prices in Figure 2 (see page 10) are referred to. 
During the twenties prices were successfully raised above the level of 
prices before. But after that period prices plummeted in spite of the 
19The Brookings Institution, International Control of Raw Materials 
(Washington D. c., 1930), p. 144. 
20 Ibid., p. 147. 
21 virgil Salera, 11 The New Coffee Agreement--Facts and Issues/1 Inter-
American Economic Affairs, XV Spring, 1962, p. 51. 
Brazilian schemes to buttress prices . Moreover , prices were never 
stabilized for any length of time except during the l930's, and then 
only at low levels. 
This situation should not necessarily be interpreted to mean 
that artificial controls can never be expected to stabilize prices. 
But the period did illustrate that Brazil was unable to control the 
world's coffee market single handedly. Although she was by far the 
greatest coffee-producing country, Brazil found that she did not 
hold a large enough share of the market to exercise what in effect 
would be a monopolistic role. Her efforts to support prices allowed 
outside areas to expand their production and enjoy high prices for a 
TABLE II 
BRAZIL'S RELATIVE SHARE OF WORLD 
EXPORTS 1920-1940 
26 
Year 
Brazilian Share 
of World Exports 
{ percent) 
Year 
Brazi 1 ian Share 
of World Exports 
{percent) 
1920 
1921 
1922 
1923 
1924 
1925 
1926 
1927 
1928 
1929 
64 
63 
62 
66 
62 
62 
60 
62 
57 
60 
Source: See Appendix B. 
1930 
1931 
1932 
1933 
1934 
1935 
1936 
1937 
1938 
1939 
69 
64 
53 
59 
56 
56 
52 
58 
57 
57 
time without assuming any of the burdens incident to control. A similar 
fate would probably be expected for any unilateral effort to stabilize 
prices at high levels. Thus it would seem that a prerequisite for any 
successful control scheme would be the creation of an international 
group which includes all producers. In this particular case Brazil 
became the residual supplier of the world 1 s coffee and ended up with a 
smaller share of the market in the end (see Table II). 
The picture painted by a.rtificial control schemes during the 
discussed period may not be entirely gloomy, however. The Brookings 
Institution study group mentioned earlier concluded that while it would 
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be too much to say that prices were stabilized, it did seem safe to say 
that extreme price fluctuations were moderated in light of the magnitude 
of outpu·t irregularities during the period. 22 The magnitude of production 
variations can be observed in Figure 3 (see page 12). 
The case is even less clear when viewed from the standpoint of the 
consumer. There was criticism about the high prices imposed upon con-
sumers during the early 1920 1 s. However, it could also be argued that 
ff prices had not been halted from their downward trend in 1919, planters 
would have been forced out of operation and thus prices would have risen 
even further later on from the pressures of contracted production. It 
will never be known how much weight should be given to this argument in 
this particular instance since this situation was not allowed to occur. 
Along with stable prices, one of the main objectives stated both 
in the valorization and defense programs was a more diversified agriculture. 
However, diversification of agriculture appeared to have been checked rather 
22srookings Institution, p. 169. 
than promoted by these policies.23 Although direct restrictions were 
placed upon new plantings, they were not effectively enforced. At the 
same time, rising prices following the first control efforts encouraged 
rather than checked expansion of the coffee industry in Brazil. 
International Control Schemes 
28 
After Brazil witnessed a decline in her relative share of the 
market in the 1930 1 s, it became obvious to her that she could not uni-
laterally support the coffee price.· As early as 1931 Brazil promoted 
attempts to reach some type of international agreement to control coffee. 
However, as long as Brazilian growers were unwilling to let their prices 
seek competitive levels, the other producers were able to find a demand 
for their entire output at profitable prices. Accordingly, they were not 
interested in binding themselves under any agreement at the time. 
In 1940, the Latin American countries found common cause for a 
multilateral agreement when the blockade of European ports, shortage 
of shipping, and general currency difficulties effectively closed the 
European market. An appeal was made to the United States to participate 
in an agreement so as to provide effective control. The invitation 
received a sympathetic reply as the United States was anxious to have the 
solid support of these countries at a time w~en she might be engulfed 
in the war in Europe. 
Thus the first international agreement to control coffee was signed 
in Washington, and was to run three years beginning October 1, 1940. En-
titled the Inter-American Coffee Agreement, the pact consisted of 14 Latin 
23srookings Institution, p. 163. 
American signatories and the United States. The Agreement embodies an 
export-quota scheme, but its most unique feature at the time grew out 
of the participation of a consumer country in a dominant role. 
Administration of the Agreement, including the adjustment of. 
quotas, was vested in an Inter-American Coffee Board, composed of 
delegates of the participating governments. Of a total of 36 votes, 
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the United States had 12, Brazil 9~ Columbia 3, and each of the other 
countries 1. The United States had the power to increase her quota 
without limit in the event that a shortage of supplies appeared irrrninent. 
? 
But any reduction of her quota in excess of 5 percent at a time required 
a unanimous vote. It was also the delegated duty of the Board to study 
the problem of coffee surpluses and to work out methods of financing and 
storing accumulated supplies. 
Since the Agreement \1/aS instituted to lessen the burden imposed by 
the loss of the European market to Latin American producers, export quotas 
to the United States were not always assigned on a historical basis. 
Producers that had formerly sent most of their output to Europe were 
allowed shipments beyond their pre-war amounts. Obviously, from the 
standpoint of the United States, the underlying political objective of 
the Agreement was to prevent the complete economic collapse of the Latin 
American members. In more technical terms the Agreement sought to provide 
effective measures for bringing the supply of coffee in international 
markets more nearly in line with the existing demand at prices 11 reasonable 
to both producers and consumers. 24 
No criteria of fairness or statement of specific price objectives 
24wickizer, p. 180. 
30 
were ever made public. But it was tacitly assumed by all members, inclu~ing 
the United States, that prices would rise somewhat above the level in 
existence when the Agreement first became effective. 
In evaluating the operation of the Inter-American Agr.eement the 
center of interest turns to the issue of 11prices 11 • The inmediate result 
of the news of an agreement was to set off a wave of speculative activity 
that drove prices upward. 25 By late 1940, prices were approximately 
100 percent higher than the months before the Agreement was signed. 
While the provisions of the Agreement had equipped the United States 
w·lth authority to raise her quota, she was reluctant to halt the upward 
trend of prices out of fear of intimidating the producing countries at 
such a critical time. However, the United States was unwilling to accept 
unlimited price increases; and in October, 1941, the Inter-American 
Coffee Board increased the United States' quota. The action of the 
Board was effective in checking a further price advance. 
But the all-important question of whether or not quota adjustments 
could, over a period of time, be effective in stabilizing prices at 
levels considered satisfactory to producers, the trade, and to consumers 
was never permitted a clear answer. With the entrance of the United 
States into the War, prices were frozen, and the administration of prices 
in effect shifted under the authority of the Office of Price Administration. 
The Inter-American Coffee Agre.ement was reviewed yearly on a 
standby basis until September, 1948. But it has already been noted that 
after the first year the Agreement exercised little effective influence 
25The question may be raised whether the price increase was simply 
due to the standard rise in food prices during war periods. Considering 
the amount of supplies on hand that were blocked from European ports 
this does not seem likely. 
:n 
upon the trends in the coffee industry. 
However, cirtain relevant issues for international control may have 
been suggested while the Agreement was in operation. For one thing the 
weight of political considerations was demonstrated, particularly with 
respectto the administration of pr·ices. The possibility of the producer 
nations being able to exploit their image as underdogs and pressure the 
consumer countries to accept unwarranted price increases may be as central 
an issue now as when the United States (which at that time represented 
the consuming sec.tor) was faced with the thr.ea·t of thij Axis Powers. 
ih1other point worth noting is that while, from the standpoint of the 
producers, the Agreement was very beneficial in the shortrun. there is the 
possibility that it contributed to long-standing difficultili;,;;; su,h as 
over ... production and falling prices in the late fifties. Certainly the 
Agreement did nothing to eliminate the fundamental difficulties facing 
the coffee industry as became quite apparent later. 
With supplies once again modest in relat'ion to demand by 1946, 
the Latin Americans opposed continuation of ·the Agreement. In the next 
tan yea . .-,1·~pa11 the more important controls affecting the flow of coffee 
were those sponsored by Brazil and Columbia. These countries pursued 
separate control schemes. but they contained similar features. Extensive 
use of credit and price support techniques characterized both countries• 
policies. The multifaceted aspects of these policies, however, makes 
1t impossible to sunmarhe the~n effectively, so the sub,iect will be 
restricted to few short ot:servijtions .of their effects. 
One of the more notable f1 .. atures of national control schemes in 
Columbia and Brazil was the technique of establ ish1ng min"imum prices for 
producers. In Columbia this level was belo~, the actual expo\"t price and 
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thus had no practical effect.26 In the case of Brazil, however, there 
is no unanimous consensus about whether she was able to manipulate 
domestic prices by fixing a minimum price paid to growers above the world 
market level. On the basis of a Federal Trade Commission study it appears 
that the domestic minimum price was nearly as much as the market price 
during 1954. But the evidence did not justify a statement that prices 
were actually manipulated above the market level.27 
With respect to loan policies, the only time that any effect upon 
the market seemed to be in evidence was in 1953-54 when loans in Brazil 
enabled the producers to hold their coffee back in anticipation of higher 
prices. How substantial this factor was in stimulating the 1954 price 
spiral cannot be ascertained since so many other factors also stood 
behind the movement. 
When coffee prices began a steep downward decline it once more 
became evident that national control efforts could not support the market. 
In 1957, coffee was again placed under international control. The 14 
Latin American producing nations founded the Latin American Coffee Agree-
ment for the purpose of restricting exports. For the next five years 
International Coffee Agreements were negotiated on a yearly basis . The 
only notable change in these from that of 1957 came in 1959 when the 
principal African producers joined the schemes. 
What effect these Agreements had is difficult to say. The decline 
in coffee prices did not continue to be so rapid but still it continued to 
slip, from 45 cents for Santos No . 4 in 1958 to a 31-37 cent range in 1961. 
26 F. T. C. , p. l 04. 
27 Ibid., p. 109 
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Over-supply remained a problem. The carryover at the end of the 1960-61 
crop year amounted to a staggering 64 million bags, mostly in Brazil. 
At the same time annual world use had only been 43 million bags. 28 
One lesson that stood out very clearly while these schemes were 
in operation was that they were in fact extremely difficult to maintain. 
Outside producers were able to expand their output and export at the 
expense of the members. In addition, it became more and more attractive 
to the individual insider to exceed his quota limit. Thus a need for 
more effective control became evident. Implementation of this goal was 
sought by including importing countries in the proposed coffee agreement 
of 1962. 
In conclusion of the chapter analyzing the past history of coffee 
controls, there is no precedent that artificial controls can bring 
greater stability to the coffee trade on a pennanent basis. Earlier 
schemes have been able to temporarily halt and reverse downward price 
trends. Moreover, inventories seem to modity seasonal and annual 
fluctuations in prices. But where ambitious efforts have succeeded in 
pushing prices to high levels the result has been to over-stimulate 
production and cause a diastrous fall in prices later. 
28Foreign Agriculture Circular, Dec. 1961, p •. 1. 
. CHAPTER IV 
THE INTERNATIONAL COFFEE AGREEMENT, 1962 
The Agreement Provisions and Objectives 
The provisions of the Agreement and their origin will now be 
su1:m1arized. 
Fifty-eight producing and consuming countries negotiated a new 
"long tennu agreement in 1962 to replace the previous "short tenn" 
coffee agreement participated in solely by producers. The nshort term" 
agreements helped to slow down, but did not halt, the decline in 
coffee prices. The inclusion of consumers in the 1 62 Agreement was 
necessary to strengthen the pact. It is also significant that the 
designation ''long term., was prefixed to the Agreement. This indicated 
a shift in the orientation of the Agreement in the di rectfon of "seeking 
adjustments of a fundamental nature, rather than acting solely as a 
stop-gap against price debacle.29 
The main features of the International Coffee Agreement of 1962 
are summarized under the following headings in their respective order: 
Agreement objectives, organization and administration, voting, quotas, 
prices, and control of production. 
29Irwin Shishko, 11The Coffee Outlook Under a 1 Model' International 
Agreement," Commodity Year Book, 1964, p. 23. 
34 
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111greement Objectives 
The objectives of the Agreement set forth in Article I are placed 
in Appendix D for reference purposes. In essence the six goals outlined 
in Article I are variations of one theme, viz, 11 to assist in increasing 
the purchasing power of exporting countries by keeping prices at equitable 
levels and by increasing consumption." Also, "long term equilibrium 
between production and consumption 11 is hoped to be achieved. And the 
Agreement should alleviate 11 the serious hardships caused by burdensome 
sL:rpluses and excessive fluctuations in the prices of coffee to the detri-
me11t of the interests of both producers and consumers. 11 These three 
objectives contain the main purpose of the Agreement. 
Exporting members naturally look towards point four caning for an 
increase in the purchasing power of coffee-exporting countries as the 
raison d'etre of the Agreement. The importers' position, on the other 
hand, is less clear. This is particularly true with regard to the 
official position of the United States. Congress evidently envisioned 
the main goal of the Agreement as one of simp~y halting the drastic 
downward trend in prices and ameliorating price fluctuations thereafter. 30 
On the other hand, the Administration, as represented by the Department 
of State, seems to favor the objective of raising prices above their 1962 
level. Indeed, this position is implied in the fact that since the 
Agreement came into operation, prices have been allowed to rise through 
30see Simon G. Hanson, "The Experience with the International Coffee 
Agreement, 11 Inter American Econe::1ic Affairs, V. XIX: No. 3 (~1inter, 1965) 
pp. 27-65. Also see United Stafi~s Senate Committee on Finance, Hearing 
on the Coffee J\greement, S. 701 (January 27, 1965), pp. 9-10. 
export restrictions without meeting any significant opposition from the 
United States. 
Organization and Administration 
The provisions of the Agreement are administered by the Inter-
national Coffee Organization which is seated in London. The structure 
of the Organization includes the International Coffee Council, its 
Executive Board, its Executive director and its Staff. 
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The International Coffee Council is the highest authority of the 
Organization and consists of one representative from each member nation. 
An Executive Board made up of seven each of importing and exporting 
members is elected by the Council. The Council appoints the Exec~tive 
Director and Staff, upon recommendation of the Board. 
Voting 
Article 12 of the Agreement defines the number and distribution 
of votes~ Exporting and importing members each hold a total of 1,000 
votes divided in the following manner. Five basic votes are assured 
to each individual member as long as the total number of basic votes 
does not exceed 150 for either categories of Agreement members. The 
remaining votes are divided among the members of each category or in 
proportion to their respective basic export or import quotas as long as 
no one member holds in excess of 400 votes. The distribution of votes 
for the 34 exporting members and 21 importing members is listed in 
Appendix E. 31 
-
31 ouring the period the I.C.A. has been in existence, there have been 
several redistributions of votes as countries have acceded to the 
Each exporting or importing member has one representative sitting 
on the Council. and his vote carries the weight of the relative number 
of votes distributed as explained on the preceding page.32 
Regulation of Exports and Imports 
37 
Like its short-term predecessors I the 1962 Agreement re lies upon 
export quotas a.s the main instrument through which it achieves its aims .. 
Total annual quotas are established by the Counci 1 on the basis of 
estimated world import requirements for the coming year (Article 30). 
For the coffee years 1962-65 Appendix F lists the basic export quotas 
for the producing member countries. 33 The Council is vested with 
authority. to review basic quotas eac~ year, and the quotas may be 
revised by a distributed t\,1~thfrds majority vote (Article 28 1 para-
graph 2) _34 Each ,year's requirements are estimated by the Council. 
For example, in 1962, total quotas were set at 99% of the basic export 
quota. In the light of these requirements, the Council assigns annual 
Agreement and as certaf n countries have, temporarily at least,. lost their 
voting rights for non-payment of administrative assessments. 
32unless specified othel'illise in the Agreement all decisions of the 
Council are taken by a distributed simple majority vote (Article 13). 
"Distributed simple majority vote11 is defined in the Agreement as a 
maJority of votes cast both by exporting members and importing members 
present and voting, counted separately. If a distributed two-thirds majority 
1s required before a proposal can be adopted and if it is not obtained, the 
proposal may be resubmitted a second and third time if a majority of the 
Counce raeimers so desire. In a third vote, if a distributed two-thirds 
majority is not obtained because of the dhsen't'ing vote of either one import-
ing or one exporting 1:nember, the proposal is considered adopted (Article 14). 
33rhe •coffee year" is defined as the period of one year, from Octo-
ber 1 through Se1>tember 30. 
34"oistributed" means that importing and export'h1g member's votes are 
counted separately. 
export quotas to the members on the same relative basis as their per-
centage share of the basic export quota. 
Quarterly export quotas for each exporting member are also fixed 
by the Council for the purpose of keeping supply in reasonable balance 
with estimated demand throughout the coffee year. These are to be 
set "as nearly as possible at 25 percent of the. annual export quota 
of each member during the coffee year" (Article 31, paragraph 2). 35 
Several provisions are included in the text of the Agreement to 
allow for adjustments of quotas during the coffee year when conditions 
seem to necessitate such action. When the Agreement was originally 
set up, if market conditions so required, the Council could review the 
quota situation and vary its percentage of the basic export quotas 
(Article 32). If marked price rises or falls occurred within brief 
periods, members could request a meeting of the Council to revise the 
total level of export quotas in effect by a distributed simple majority 
vote (Article 34). 
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On March 19, 1965, the Council approved a resolution which pro-
vided more specific and rapid means for adjusting quotas through the 
year. Essentially the resolution consists of a device which ties quotas 
to a specified price range. The resolution provides an indicator price 
range from 38 to 44 cents. 
In order to calculate an aver~ge price for comparison with the 
indicator price range, the following arrangements are set forth. Coffees 
of all origins are assigned to one of three categories of coffees--mild 
I 
35The Agreement stipulates that "no member shall be allowed to export 
more than 30 percent in the first quarter, 60 percent in the ffrst two 
quarters, and 80 percent in the first three quarters of the coffee year. 11 
or washed arabicas, unwashed arabicas, and robustas. Then, using New 
York ex-dock prices for prompt shipment, the arithmetic mean of the 
prices of the three categories of coffees are det~mnined. These in 
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turn are averaged together to obtain the average price which is compared 
to the indicator price range. 
If the average price falls below the floor indicator price (38¢) 
or rises above the ceiling price ( 44¢) for any 15 day period, the 
Executive Board meets to consider adjusting quotas upwards or dm'lfnwards 
as the case might be. If the Board decides that the cause of the price 
trend is not due to temporary factors ·it may lower pro rata the annual 
export quotas vvhen prices fall be"loH the range or vice versi,.36 
In addition to the above provisions for adjustments in total 
quotas, Article 60 provides a 11waiver clause 11 • This clause permits 
a member to be relieved of its obligation provided a case of extreme 
hardship or inequitable treatment can be demonstrated and a distributed 
two-thirds majority in the Council concurs with its appeal. 
One of the most str·iking differences between the 1962 Agreement 
and the earlier agreements is the active role assumed by importing members 
in enforcing the export quotas es tab 1 i shed by the Counci 1. Importing 
members have agreed to require that 11 certi fi cates of origin or re-export" 
accompany all shipments of coffee into their ports from member countries. 
(Article 44). 37 
36The Board's decision to adjust quotas are limited to 6.0 percent 
of the annual quotas in the first quarter and 4.5 percent, 3.0 percent, 
and 1.5 percent, respectively in the remaining quarters of the year. 
37The effective date for exporting members to prohibit exports 
unless accompanied by certificates or origin or re-export and on which 
importing members were to prohibit imports from the members not 
The certificate establishes that coffee has been produced in a 
given country and thus provides information on the international move-
ment of coffee. Importing members are obligated to prohibit entry of 
coffee from any member when such coffee is not accompanied by a 
certificate. This way the Council is informed if export quotas are not 
being adhered to by members. 
In the event that an exporting member exceeds the quota allocated 
to it, the Council shall deduct from its future quotas double the 
amount of the excess. If the member still fails to comply to its 
quota, the Council may require its removal from the organization in 
accordance with Article 69. 
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Also, the Agreement contains measures to prevent non-member exporting 
countries from increasing their share of exports at the expense of 
exporting members. Article 45 of the Agreement addresses itself to this 
particular problem with a provision to regulate imports. If non-members 
represent more than 5 percent of world coffee exports in the calendar 
year of 1961, each importing member is obligated to restrict its imports 
from these non-member exporters to the average taken during the three 
years prior to the activiation of the Agreement. 38 
accompanied by the certificates was initially set for April, 1964. The 
date was later changed to October 1, 1964, because of legislative problems 
in certain member countries. Even at the delayed date the United States 
Congress had not passed legislation authorizing collection of the certifi-
cates. This made for a very peculiar situation for the United States. 
The Government had ratified the Agreement, but it was not empowered to 
apply one of the main provisions mandatory in the Agreement. A special 
procedure was adopted for using the certificates on a voluntary basis. 
Legislation was finally enacted, and on May 24, 1965, the President of 
the United States signed the bill authorizing the requirement of certifi-
cates of origin on imports into the country. 
381n order to facilitate the expansion of coffee consumption, 
Prices 
The price objectives to be pursued under the Agreement are alluded 
to in numerous places throughout its text. Equitable price levels is 
a phrase that permeates the context of the Agreement time and again. 
But just what constitutes an equitable level was not defined clearly 
in the Agreement. The most explicit statement contained in the Agree-
ment itself was found in Article 27, paragraphs 2 and 3-- 11 The members 
agree on the necessHy of assuring that the general level of coffee 
prices does not decline below the level of such prices in 1962. The 
members further agree on the desirability of assuring to consumers 
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prices which are equitable and which will not hamper a desirable increase 
in consumption. 039 
According to Irwin Shishko, the main reason for a specific price 
zone not being included in the document was the: 
danger of inviting an open collision in price view-
points at a time when a collision could have endangered 
successful negotiation of the Agreement. Inevitably, 
producer and consumer price viewpoints were somewhat 
divergent. To some producers, the Agr, ::>rrient was the 
menns of brinOing about a major price-revival. Ambitious 
pr-ice goals were openly voiced by some producer 
representatives. On the other hand, most consuming 
countries viewed the Agreement as a mechanism for price 
support rather than price elevation. Indeed a number 
of these governments justified joining the Agreement 
by telling their citizens that membership by consuming 
shipments to certain countries having a low per capita consumption of 
coffee are not charged to the quotas of exporting members. To prevent 
re-export of coffee from these countries, the Counci 1 is empowered to 
require special markings for coffee going to these areas and importing 
members may be required not to accept coffee with such marking. 
39Average price Santos 4 was 34.0¢ ex dock New York in 1962. 
:oor:Iber is tmtiritly :ntspandbll:'2 for tilfJ policies at1d f, roc,H:!ures it 
selects to a<:Mtiv~ these aims. DJ;' ;;i dfatrinuted two .. thirds 1m1jority 
vote the Council 1::ay dttondth:} tha.t any im:ii vi dual m6mber has not 
it wais point.id out 1n Gh~i>Wr II, is that: crf a pe·rsbt.::r,t excess riro-
ductfon in roht1on to ti1tt dramedkJ for CC>ffei61. 
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Operation of the 1962 Agreement 
In the four years the Coffee Agreement has been in effect over 
a dozen significant quota actions have been taken (see Appendix G). 
The CoffeeCouncil has also been active in other areas. The adoption 
of the automatic quota adjusting mechanism mentioned earlier is perhaps 
one of the most important actions under the Agreement. Also numerous 
studies concerning production control have been initiated by the 
Council. It would require excessive space to discuss the details of 
actions instituted under the Agreem2nt. Thus in the interest of 
btevi ty the more important actions of the Board are 1 i sted chrono-
logically in Appendix G for reference. 
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CHAPTER V 
EVALUATION OF THE 1962 COFFEE AGREEMENT 
Criticisms 
Evaluation of the scope and operation of the Coffee Agreement in 
this chapter will use as a point of departure the following criticisms 
commonly applied to such commodity arrangements: 41 
(1) Agreements have a reputation for meeting eventual failure. 
Their effectiveness is riddled when enforcement is weakened by non-
compliance, resignations, and by expansion of supplies in non-member 
areas. Their existence is further endangered because they are inevitably 
complicated and expensive to operate. 
(2) Agreements are clothed in the language of stabilization, but 
political pressures originating from high cost producers and countries 
seeking funds for industrialization invariably push for higher prices. 
{3) Subsequently, it becomes impossible to stabilize prices at 
moderate levels and consideration of consumer interests becomes neglected. 
{4) A further result is that artificially high price levels lead 
to consumption being retarded and overproduction being encouraged. 
41 Irwin Shishko, p. 22. United Nations Conference on Trade and 
Development, 11 Stabilization of International Commodity Markets". 
Commodity Trade, pp. 81-112. V. D. Wickizer, pp. 164-165. 
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(5) Permanent controls of production accompanied by diversification 
programsare unlikely to forestall excessive production because of the 
failure to make adequate provision in the Agreement for regulation of 
additions to productive capacity. 
(6) The resultant accumulation of stocks may prove to be 
excessive and enhance the dangers of the Agreement breaking down on 
the producer 1s side. 
Let us see how these criticisms apply to the Coffee Agreement. 
Problems of Compliance and Enforcement 
Agreements have a reputation for meeting eventual failure. 
Their effectiveness is riddled when supplies in non,-member areas expand 
and when enforcement is weakened by non-compliance and resignations. 
The review of the experience of control in the coffee industry in 
Chapter III well illustrates that earlier schemes have been wrecked by 
expansion of production and exports by non-members. This was true for 
the Brazilian price support schemes in the thirties in particular. 
Moreover, the danger cannot be ignored that compliance with a pact, 
organized on an international basis, may be difficult to maintain. 
This possibility has been born out by similar agreements in other commodity 
areas. The International Wheat Agreement, for instance, became impotent 
when some of its members refused to meet their obligations to supply 
and purchase stipulated quantities of wheat regardless of the market price 
for wheat. 
Similar dangers confront the 1962 International Coffee Agreement. 
The current Agreement, however, started with certain precautions. The fact 
that members represent over 95 percent of the world production of coffee 
greatly reduces the danger that the Agreement will be wrecked by non-
members expanding their production and trade. 
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What is even more significant is the fact that the Agreement, unlike 
its short term predecessors, includes the world's major consumers. This 
is important because they have agreed to prevent an expansion of exports 
from non-member producers. 
The Certificates of Origin required by consumers and turned over 
to the coffee organization discourages non-compliance with quotas on the 
part of exporter members. This practice informs the Coffee Organization 
about compliance and thus enables it to threaten expulsion of violators 
from the Agreement. This would be undesirable from the standpoint of the 
producer concerned because its exports would then be subject to the same 
restrictions as the non-member exporters. 
Thus the Agreement seems to contain strong provisions of enforce-
ment as compared to its predecessors. However, its main guarantee 
against non-compliance depends upon the willingness of consumers to comply 
with their end of the Agreement. If prices rise too much, the importer 
members would no longer be willing to police their quota restrictions. 
Subsequently, the Agreement would be placed in mortal danger of dis-
' integration. The Agreement may already have had some very pointed warning 
along these lines. Following the rapid and large increase of prices in 
1963 and 1964 the weakening of prices experienced in 1965 and 1966 was 
partially explained as being brought about by the appearance of significant 
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supplies of coffee from unknown or doubtful .origins. According to 
42see Wall Street Journal, 11 A Sharp Rebound in World Coffee Output 
Threatens Producing Nations' Economies, 11 April 18, 1966, p. 24. 
the Wall Street Journal, one method of smuggling involved the movement 
of coffee from producer member countries through non-member countries 
to mysteriously lose its identity and later appear in sales to a 
consumer member country. Of course, the very fact that the merchandise 
was smuggled makes it impossible to give figures as to how much coffee 
has been illegally traded. The New York Coffee Roasters Association 
estimated that in 1966 smuggled coffee shipped to the United States 
valued 11well in excess of $50 million. 11 43 Limited supplies cour,led 
with high prices would predictably encourage import traders to seek 
ways to curcumvent the quota restrictions on coffee. Under such con-
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di tions their governments may be hesitant or lax in enforcing the Agree-
meht, especially if the level of prices is considered excessive. 
It is often observed that commodity agre€Tient failures can fre-
quently be attributed to their inability to meet inordinately large 
expense requirements. Of course, it is a difficult task for an inter-
national body to find ways to meet expenses. 
The drafters of the Agreement apparently recognized the need to 
minimize the expenses required by the Agreement in view of the difficulties 
involved in financing them. Thus the obligation to meet expenses 
incurred from production controls and the storage and disposal of stocks 
has been left with the producers. The absence of any buffer stock 
arrangement is further attributed to a desire to minimize the need for 
funds. It might prove to be shortsighted, however, to argue that the 
Agreement is thus not endangered by the expenses of these activities. 
43Ibid., 11Smugglers Find Profit in the Coffee Business, 11 Vol. XLVI, 
No. 93, February 23, 1966, p. 1. 
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The costs must sti 11 be shouldered, and they may prove more than the pro-
ducer countries themselves can meet. Thus it is yet to be seen whether 
or not prohibitive expenses will prove inimical to the continued 
existence of the Coffee Agreement. 
Operational Difficulties 
Commodity Agreements are frequently declared to be doomed to failure 
because they are overwhelmingly complicated to operate. 
Whether or not the Coffee Agreement will prove to be too complicated 
to operate effectively cannot yet be seen. To date the Agreement continues 
to operate, not because it has not been beset by difficulties, but in 
spite of them. Only time will tel 1 if this wil 1 continue to be the case. 
However, it may be instructive to point to the nature of some of the 
complicating factors inherently built into the Agreement. 
Most of the complications that test the sinews of the Agreement 
derive directly or indirectly from establishing price levels and quota 
assignments. These two issues will be discussed together as they are 
irrevocably linked. Manipulation of quotas automatically manipulates 
prices. 
The job of agreeing upon total export quotas and then distributing 
the quotas is an arduous task in itself. Since quota setting influences 
prices, impersonal market forces are no longer directing and reconciling 
production and consumption decisions. The welfare objectives of fair and 
equitable prices become imperfect; they do not lend themselves to per-
manent settlement. The Coffee Agreement requires that a compromise be 
reached on a fair price range that will at the same time be consistent 
with economic facts. At the same time it .is questionable that a consensus 
could ever be found to identify such a range. 44 Therefore, some sort 
of historical basis will probably be the basis for price settlements. 
Since the Agreement deals with a commodity traded internationally, it 
is probably safe to say {current discussion verifies this statement} 
that prices will be influenced according to some definition of a tenns 
of trade relationship between coffee exporters and importers. Whether 
agreement can be reached on a proper ratio is questionable. It may 
even be more uncertain whether or not this manner of setting price 
ranges can at the same time prevent chaos from ultimately developing 
in the coffee industry and trade. 
Thus far the problem of reaching agreement on settling quotas and 
prices has proved to be manageable. The most notable evidence of this 
is the semi-automatic price-quota formula enacted in 1965. Of course, 
this scheme does not in itself present a complete solution. It is yet 
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to be seen whether the established pr·i ces wi 11 live up to future production 
needs. If production surpluses continue or shortages should develop, 
the task of setting a new range w111 become necessary. Moreover, it 
was noted earlier that quota adjustments triggered by the price mechanism 
occur on a pro rata basis. Thus the dynamics of the trade which calls for 
shifting patterns of production from time to time still presents compli-
cations because friction is bound to develop over who gets what share 
of quota anotments. 
It must also be noted that, in fact, the concept of 11 a coffee price 11 
is deceiving for there are many prices reflecting the variety of types 
44see the Brookings Institution, International Control of Raw Materials 
(Washington O.C., 1930), p. 284. 
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and grades of coffee used in the world trade. These price differentials 
and variations serve to bring adequate supplies of desired grades and 
types of coffee to the coffee roasters. Under the present arrangement, 
however, ii: a shortage of say Brazil s occurs their increase in price 
must be sufficient to raise the overall price average of all varieties 
of coffee to a level above the ceiling before the quota of Brazils can 
be revised upwards. The relative movement of prices might thus be 
expected :l:!o be quite 1 a rge. Moreover, the change in the ava i 1 ab i1 i ty 
of all coffees could plausibly cause considerable disruption to world 
trade in certain instances. To illustrate the point it will further be 
supposed that the available amounts of Robustas as detennined by the 
market are excessive. This being the case, Brazils' prices would have 
to rise even more in order to exert enough pressure on the average price 
indicator to increase .. quotas and release larg19r supplies of Brazils. 
But a pro rata increase in quotas would cause the excess of Robustas 
to become even greater and drive their prices down further. However, 
it should not be forgotten that a limit exists as to how much relative 
prices can fluctuate. In this case it would be expected that the down-
ward direction pursued by Brazils would eventually lead to their being 
substituted in place of Robustas. It follows then that the pressure on 
Robustas could eventually be relieved. However, Robusta is apparently 
not very suitable, because of its distinct flavor, for use in regular 
coffee which absorbs over 80 percent of the total green coffee roasted. 45 
Therefore, the possibility of substituting Robusta for Brazilian coffee 
45Gertrud Lovasy and Loutle Boissoneault, 11 The International Coffee 
Market, 11 International Monetary Fund Staff Papers, XI (Nov., 1964), 
pp. 378-384. 
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to offset defi ci enci es in the 1 atter is limited. 46 
Cooperation can only be realized if the desirability of stabilized 
coffee prices is recognized and pursued. Otherwise it would be too much 
to expect consumer members to continue meeting their end of the Agreement. 
This leads to the next issue. l~ill prices be stabilized under the Coffee 
Agreement? 
Stabilization or Price Hiking 
A major criticism listed against conrnodity agreements contends that 
higher prices rather than stabilized prices are the true motives of such 
schemes. Statements made by spokesmen of the producer countries leave 
considerable room for suspecting that indeed this feature applies to 
the International Coffee Agreement. Moreover, these producer elements have 
substantial implicit support, apparently, from the representatives of 
certain of the importing members, though it is questionable that the 
consumers represented would knowi~gly concur with such designs. Admittedly, 
in view of the low trough met by prices at the time the Agreement came 
into effect, it was probably reasonable to expect prices to rise somewhat. 
However, the average increase in prices occurred rapidly and ended 
substantially above the 1962 levels. For instance, from 1963 to 1964 
the annual average of Brazils increased nearly 39 percent from 34.5 cents 
to 47.9 cents a pound. (see Appendix C) 
In the face of producer efforts to increase prices, the question 
46on the other hand Mild coffees and Brazils are widely interchangeable 
and thus their elasticityC>'fsubstitution is much greater; subsequently, 
a smaller relative mcvement of prices would be expected if these two were 
used in the illustration above. 
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arises--do consumer members of the Agreement possess adequate safeguards 
to protect them from excessive price hikes? If not, the Agreement would 
properly be labeled a producers' cartel. 
Proponents of the 1962 Coffee Agreement proudly call attention to 
the fact that the Agreement represents importing as well as exporting 
countries and that all interests are protected by the Agreement's provi-
sions. Inclusion of importers in the Agreement is obviously a necessary 
condition if consumers are to have a voice. The nature of their role 
in the Agreement provisions must be considered more fully. 
It will be recalled that before annual or quarterly quotas can be 
established or adjusted by the Council a two-thirds majority of producer 
and consumer members alike is required. From a superficial glance one 
would be tempted to assume that the consumer's interest could not be 
endangered by restrictive quotas that would result in excessive prices. 
However, the matter is more compl2x as it soon became apparent 
fo 11 owing Brazil I s unexpected reduction in producUon in 1963. Ironically, 
the two-thirds distributed majority became the instrument that blocked 
consumer demands for ·increased quotas in t..,e face of sharply rising 
prices. Since the annual quotas had already been established for a 
periodt a two-thirds distributed majority was required before the 
quotas could be adjusted upwards. But the increase in quotas was opposed 
by a group of producers who had been unable to export their assigned 
quotas. By resisting the effort to free supplies elsewhere they 
became the benefactors of increasing prices. Consequently, even though 
the consumer members voted unanimously for the increase to halt the price 
hike, their effort was blocked. However, the problem of adjusting quotas 
to meet unexpected price movements has since become an automatic process 
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under the quota-price adjusting formula. 
Nevertheless, another potential danger still exists. This lies in 
the possibility of individual exporting countries implementing independent 
price supports by refusing to release supplies to meet their quotas. 
This sort of action has been taken by the Brazilian Coffee Institute47 
and Uganda. In addition, the Inter-African Coffee Agreement has operated 
towards the same ends. The existence of the International Coffee Agree-
ment enhances the chances for success for these schemes. The quota 
restrictions limit the possibility of consumers circumventing such 
independent action because they can no longer shift to other sources of 
supply. If such action is pursued without moderation and results in 
.substantially higher prices, resistence on the part of consumers might 
develop until they are no longer willing to participate in the Agreement. 
If prices are pushed to artificial and excessive he1gh_t:5_-1?l_! 
commodit>: agreement! consumption will be retarded and _overproduction 
encouraged. Thus it is essential to look at the behavior of production 
ancl consumption under the Agreement. 
Since 1963 the annual world trade in coffee has been declining 
(see Chart I). In 1963 total world exports amounted to 2~938 thousand 
tons. By 1965 exports had fallen 300 thousand tons to 2,640 thousand 
tons. Roastings in importing countries also declined. In the United 
States total roastings fell 1n l965 to 1.30 million tons as against 
1.34 million tons in 1965 and 1.37 in l963. 48 
These declines· 1n trade were partially explained by the restrictive 
47conjuntura ~conomica. Jan., 1964 XI (1) p. 4. 
48 
.. F.A.O., Conmod1ty Review 1966, pp. 112-113. 
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quota policies of the AgrE~ement (see Appendix G}. Nevertheless, there 
is increasing evidence that the 1963-64 increase in prices has also begun 
to affect consumption. While in previous years reduced exports had 
meant higher export earnings, this ceased to be the case in 1965. Export 
earnings in that year were 2120 million dollars as compared to 2312 
million a year earlier. Thus reducing exports in 1965 did not bring 
sufficient force on the market to halt a decline in the price of coffee 
which apparently was caused by reduced demand. It seems very plausible 
that the increase in prices in 1963-64 may have been instrumental in 
setting off this reduction. 
It is more difficult to discern the effect of world market prices 
on coffee production than consumption. There is not a direct and un-
broken chain in the world market price of coffee and the price received 
by coffee growers. Rather each producer government has the power to 
change prices received by growers with some independence from the world 
market price.49 For example, Brazil has in effect been confiscating 
a part of the foreign exchange earned from coffee for many years. 
Nearly all producer governments follow a similar path of setting the 
price received by their growers. Mob'lithstanding this fact it has been 
suggested that probably the producer governments would be prone to 
allow their growers a larger return in the face of relatively strong 
prices than if world market prices were weak. Unfortunately, this is a 
conjectural statement as the prices paid to growers by their respective 
governments are not available here to be compared to the world's market 
prices. In any case the trend of excessive production has been unabated 
since the agreement has been brought into force. The near world record 
49Sh1shko. p. 23. 
level of production in 1964-1966 illustrates that production has not 
successfully been reduced to date. 
Control of Production 
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The International Coffee Agreement is a scheme designed to maintain 
coffee prices in the face of excess production by manipulating or 
supplanting the regular operation of market forces. This necessitates 
the use of artificial production controls to stem surpluses. We shall 
now try to determine j f the 'i9!..eement has mad.§! adegua t1;~ _pro vis ton to 
regulate _addit~e_roduc!.ive capacit,X. 
The wording of the Agreement repeatedly refers to the necessity of 
bringing production into a more reasonable balance with consumption. 
Moreover, diversification programs are strongly espoused in the draft. 
However, at present its own active role in this matter is restricted to 
recommendations on proper techniques and goals for production control and 
diversification programs. The actual job of setting up and implementing 
such programs is left to the governments of the producing countries. 
To date these schemes have failed to prove to be effective in reducing 
total production. Brazil did succeed in reducing her number of new 
plantings. However, the adoption of higher yielding varieties of trees 
has pretty well offset the effect of smaller plantfrigs to date. It 
remains to be seen if Brazil I s action to reorientate her program on the 
bash of actual production will reduce output. 
While most of the producer members are initiating permanent controls 
of one kind or another, it is difficult to be overly optimistic about 
their chances for success. For one thing it is questionable that these 
countries have the available resources to support such schemes. Moreover, 
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small countries may not recognize the need to restrict production to the 
degree that a producer the size of Brazil does. Individually they will 
not notice directly the influence of their production on prices and will 
thus be less urgent in their efforts to cut back production. These and 
many other considerations serve notice that many complications may beset 
efforts to control production. However, the higher world prices are, the 
greater is the likelihood that the difficulties of control will be 
increased. It was suggested earlier that high prices nay compound 
political pressures internally in the countries to alliJ~~ production to 
expand. 
The Agreement probably makes it somewhat easier for individual 
producer governments to institute production and diversification programs 
because they do not have to worry so much about other producers benefiting 
at their expense. Hov.revert if prices are going to be maintained at 
relatively high levels, it would seem that more definite measures may be 
needed to be applic~d by the~ Agreement before excessive production will be 
eliminated. It is particularly notable that to date the Agreement has 
no specific sanctions for countries that fail to take adequatE, action to 
reduce their excessive production. The problem of over-production is 
under study by the Council and, hopefully, some fruitful decision will be 
made in the near future. 
The Role of the United States 
One of the strongest elements acting in favor of the Coffee Agreement 
is the determination of the Unfted States to make the Agreement a success. 
The United States is actively concerned with promoting measures that will 
facilitate economic development in the coffee growing countries of 
Latin America and Africa. 
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The Kennedy Administration was concerned that declining foreign 
exchange earnings of the Latin American countries would block the United 
States• designs to aid these countries in developing their economies. 
The drop in export prices from 1957 through 1962 cost the fifteen Latin 
American coffee producing countries an average of nearly $600,000,000 a 
year over the five year period.SO During the first year of the Alliance 
for Progress Program, aggregate United States economic assistance to the 
Latin American coffee countries amounted to $707,500,000. Thus coffee 
losses nearly matched United States aid. The Johnson Administration has 
continued to show r.in attitude thot the Coffee Agrec-ment is a necessary 
supplementary instrument to our aid program. 
Since the United States consumes approximately 50 percent of the 
world's coffee, her support has been invaluable at times whr!n the Agree-
ment has been in jeopardy. This support will quite likely continue to 
be one of the (if not the) most important factors contributing to the 
future success of the 1962 Coffee Agreement. 
50Pan American Coffee Bureau, Impact of Coffee on the U.S. Economy 
( New York - 1964) , p. 13. 
CHAPTER VI 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
With respect to the question of whether market conditions in the 
coffee trade necessitate or warrant an attempt to correct the ~' tuation 
by managing the market the following observations were made. The trade 
has been confronted with violent price fluctuations through most of 
this century. At the time that the International Coffee Agreement of 
1962 was being proposed the main stress was on tile low level reached by 
prices. However, since the proposal called for a lonn tenn solution 
to the problem, it seems more apt in the author's opinion to refer to 
price gyrations both in the 11 bus t 11 and 11 boom 11 stages. These extremely 
volatile price movements have been in a sense bot,i ;:;1 result of and cause 
of imbalance occurring between the world's available coffee supplies 
and'needs;;.·:At any rate coffee prices have proved to be undesirably 
unstable from both the consumer and producer countries I standpoint, 
particularly the latter. 
It was concluded in Chapter II that, due to the inherent nature of 
supply and demand characteristics of coffee, prices will irrevocably 
continue to be unstable if left solely to the forces of an unregulated 
market. Thus at least c1. preliminary case seems to exist for managing the 
price of coffee by some scheme other than the unregulated forces of supply 
and demand. 
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In view of the fact that past un11 ter 1 control efforts have con-
sistently been rendered ineffective by expansion of supplies from outside, 
it seems that an international approach would be more sensible and lfkely 
to achieve its objectives. In addition. consumer inclusion in the Agree-
ment is praised on the basis that this is a pre-condition if the scheme 
is to be more than an international producers' cartel. It was also 
argued in Chapters IV and V that consumer membership fortifies the stamina 
of control schemes greatly when their agreement to help police its enforce-
ment is obtained. On each of these counts the International Coffee Agree-
ment ranks favorably because they are included in its scope. 
However, i t is recognized and stressed that the future succe s of 
the Agreement 1s by no means guaranteed simply because it has broad 
support and is in many respects equipped with recommended provisions. The 
nature of the task which the Agreement undertakes is very complex as is 
always the case when an effort is made to supplant the regular operation 
of the market. It is by no means settled that the Agreement will be able 
to solve the problems inherent to the coffee trade. For the time being, 
admittedly, prices have been relatively stabilized, apparently as a 
result of the operation of the Coffee Agreement. However, the long standing 
problem of over-production and excess supplies remains as acute now as 
ever. 
To date no totally acceptable means has been fo~nd for managing 
price levels and quotas so that they will be considered fair by all parties . 
At the same time no method has been adopted that satisfactorily el1minat@s 
the necessity of prices playing an active part in organizing production 
and consumption decisions and promoting economic efficiency in the world 
coffee industry. Subsequently, the problem remains that the nature of the 
Agreement may lead to a situation 1,,1here prices must be mar:aged to meet 
two ends that may not always be compatible. 
60 
l·Jhil e the Agreement has been ab 1 e to secure agreement and compliance 
on quota and price decisions so far with some success, this has been 
achieved mainly because of« i'illingness by both exporter and importer 
members to co-operate. Continued surpluses could undermine this willing-
ness on the part of producers. Failure to bring production in line with 
consumption at current prices gives ammunition to dissident importer 
countries to insist on lower prices. 
When stabilized prices become high prices, the. probable reaction 
of importer members wi 11 be a reduced wi 11 i ngness to comply ~l/i th the Agree-
ment. Enforcement of the quota system of the Agreement leans heavily 
on the support of the importer countries. For this reason a healthy 
environment for the operation of this Agreement recognizes that consumer 
and producer members have a mutual interest in ste.ble prices--prices that 
do not fluctuate in excess either upwards or dowmJards. Unfortunately, 
producer members of the Agreement have evinced little evidence of authen-
tically trying to recognize that prices may also be excessively high. 
So, while the immediate collapse of the Agreement doesn't seem 
to be in the offing, it must also be recognized that its continued long 
term success will depend on its ability to overcome a number of difficulties 
that haven't been overcome to date. 
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Marketing 
Year 
1899-1900 1 
1900-1901 
1901-1902 
1902-1903 
1903-1904 
1904-1905 
1905-1906 
1906-1907 
1907-1908 
1908-1909 
1909-1910 
1910-1911 
1911-1912 
1912-1913 
1913-1914 
1914-1915 
1915-1916 
1916-1917 
1917-1918 
1918-1919 
1919-1920 
1920-1921 
1921-1922 
1922-1923 
1923-1924 
1924-1925 
1925-1926 
1926-1927 
1927-1928 
1928-1929 
APPENDIX A-I 
WORLD PRODUCTION OF COFFEE, 
ANNUALLY, 1900-1966 
(Thousand Metric Tons) 
Brazil Other 
Countries 
564 264 
678 228 
966 216 
774 222 
666 294 
630 234 
648 £34 
1212 216 
660 234 
774 240 
918 228 
648 222 
780 258 
726 258 
870 306 
810 264 
960 288 
762 240 
948 180 
sa2 · 270 
450 462 
870 348 
774 414 
612 342 
894 4:14 
NA NA 928 513 951 499 
1627 545 1418 399 
66 
World 
Total 
828 
906 
1188 
1002 
960 
864 
888 
1428 
894 
1014 
1146 
870 
1044 
984 
1176 
1074 
1248 
1002 
1128 
852 
912 
1218 
1188 
954 
1302 
NA 
1441 
1450 
2172 
1817 
Marketing 
Year 
1929-19302 
1930-1931 
1931-1932 
1932-1933 
1933-1934 
1934-1935 
1935-1936 
1936-1937 
1937-1938 
1938-1939 
1939-1940 
1940-1941 
1941-1942 
1942-1943 
1943-1944 
1944-1945 
1945-1946 
1946-1947 
1947-1948 
1948-1949 
1949-1950 
1950-1951 
1951-1952" 
1952-1953 
1953-1954 
1954-1955 
1955-1956 
1956-1957 
1957-1958 
1958-1959 
1959-1960 
1960-1961 
1961-1962 
1962-1963 
1963-1964 . 
1964-196: 
1965-1966 
APPENDIX A-I (Continued) 
Brazil 
1736 
994 
1712 
993 
1778 
1089 
1225 
1736 
1414 
1398 
1157 
1002 
961 
839 
921 
686 
834 
917 
947 
1037 
1068 
1071 
1080 
1125 
1110 
1037 
1370 
979 
1407 
1695 
2646 
1800 
2152 
1620 
1692 
600 
2100 
Other 
Countries 
736 
739 
723 
801 
806 
793 
939 
825 
972 
945 
969 
879 
895 
886 
914 
938 
967 
1001 
9'78 
1115 
1070 
1075 
1226 
1288 
1356 
1426 
1471 
1534 
1746 
1804 
1932 
2056 
2264 
2380 
2530 
2540 
2638 
World 
Total 
2472 
1733 
2435 
1795 
2584 
1882 
2165 
2561 
2386 
2343 
2126 
1881 
1856 
1745 
1835 
1614 
1801 
1918 
1925 
2152 
2138 
2146 
2306 
2413 
2466 
2463 
2841 
2513 
3153 
3499 
4578 
3856 
4414 
4000 
4220 
3140 
4728 
· 67 
Source: lv. o. Wickizer, The World Coffee Econoffl.f With Special Reference 
to Control Schemes (Stanford, l953). ·pp. 240-24 • 
2F.A.O., The World Coffee Economy: C0111Dod1ty Bulletin No. 33 
(Rome, 1961), pp. 53-55. 
Calendar Year 
191i 
1914 
1915 
1916 
1917 
1918 
1919 
1920 
1921 
1922 
1923 
1924 
1925 
1926 
1927 
1928 
1929 
1930 
1931 
1932 
1933 
1934 
1935 
1936 
1937 
1938 
APPENDIX 8-I 
ANNUAL WORLD EXPORTS AND 
EXPORTABLE PRODUCTION] 
1913-1965 
(Thousand Metric Tons) 
Brazilian World Marketing 
Exports Exports Year 
796.08 1159.98 
676.20 1060.08 
1023.66 1389.12 
782.34 1145.70 
636 36 965.74 
445.98 747.90 
777.78 1339.32 
691.50 1085.22 
742.14 1195.86 
760.38 1225.14 
· 867 .96 1322.28 
853.56 1361.10 
808.92 1281.66 
825.06 1358.82 
906.90 1443.60 
832.96 1449.40 
856.9 1435.3 
917.3 1545.3 
1071.1 1674.6 
716.1 1357 .4 
927.6 1584.8 
843.8 1517.8 
919.7 1629.9 
851.2 1661. 1 
727.4 1521.4 
1026.8 1805.3 
68 
World 
Exportable 
Production 
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APPENDIX B-1 (Continued} 
Calendar Year Brazilian World Marketing World 
Exports Exports Year Exportable 
Production 
19393 989.9 1742.4 
1940 722. 7 1403.4 
1941 663. l 1268. l 1940-1944 av. 1502 
1942 436.8 1093.2 
1943 606.7 1365.9 
1944 813.3 1566.2 
1945 850.3 1657.7 
1946 830.3 1748.2 1945-1946 1494 
1947 889.9 1715 .• '5 1946-1947 1624 
1948 1049.5 1936.8 1947-1948 1646 
1949 1162. l 2049.8 1948-1949 1838 
1950 890.1 1750.2 1949-1950 1759 
1951 981.5 1911 • 2 1950-1951 1817 
1952 949.3 1937.0 1951-1952 1789 
1953 933.5 2069.5 1952-1953 ' 1958 
19544 657.0 . 1739. 1 1953-1954 2028 
1955 821.7 2030.7 1954-1955 2024 
1956 1008.3 · 2282.5 1955-1956 2616 
1957 859.2 2159.8 1956-1957 2076 
1958 772.9 2146.2 1957-1958 2772 
1959 1046.2 2516.3 1958-1959 3120 
1960 · 1009. 1 2593 .0 1959-1960 3984 
1961 1018 2626 1960-1961 3174 
1962 982 2757 1961-1962 3498 
1963 1171 2938 1962-1963 3204 
1964 897 2789 1963-1964 3414 
1965 839 2640 1964-1965 2226 
1966 1965-1966 3884 
1Exportable Production represents total production minus domestic 
consumption. 
2v. D. Wickizer, The World Coffee Economy With Seecial Reference to 
Control Schemes. (Stanford, 1943), pp. 247. 
31940-54 Commodity Year Book, 1955, p. 109. 
41955-66 Commodity Year B~ok, 1966, p. l 04. 
Continent or Country 19291 
-
North and Central 
America 
TOTAL 192.7 
· South America 
Brazil 856.9 
Columbia 170.2 
TOTAL 1102.0 
Africa 
TOTAL 45.6 
Asia and Ocenia 
TOTAL 95.0 
WORLD TOTAL 1435.3 
APPENDIX B-II 
EXPORTS OF COFFEE BY SELECTED COUNTRIES OR 
CONTINENTS, ANNUALLY, 1929-30 to 1965-66 
1930 1931 1932 1933 1934 1935 
229.2 194.4 170.9 237.8 220.4 200.0 
917.3 l 071. l 716. 1 927.6 843.8 919.7 
190.4 182.0 191. l 199.6 l 85.1 226. l 
1167.9 1322.4 970.5 1173.0 1101.3 1218.7 
65.1 71. l 86 .1 86.8 98.9 112 .6 
83. l 86.7 129.9 87.0 97.2 97.6 
1545.3 1674.6 1357 .4 1584.8 1517.8 1629.9 
1936 1937 1938 1939 
237.3 241.7 223.7 234.6 
851.2 727.4 1026.8 989.9 
236.5 250.7 256.4 226.4 
1170. 2 1039.3 1338.1 1262.5 
137 .2 128. l 158.4 161.6 
116.4 112.3 85.1 83.7 
1661. l 1521.4 1805.3 1742.4 
Source: 1F.A.O., The World Coffee Econom.}I', Conmodity: Bulletin Series No. 33 (Rome, 1961), pp. 56-57. 
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APPENDIX B-11 (Continued) 
Continent or Country 1940 1941 1942 1943 1944 1945 
-
North and Central 
America 
TOTAL 194.3 190.2 200.4 223 .2 224.8 235.2 
·South America 
Brazi 1 722.7 663. l 436.8 606.7 813.3 850.3 
Columbia 266.4 174.1 258.6 315 .1 295.4 309.0 
TOTAL 1034.8 898.4 739. l 964.2 1145.4 1201.3 
Africa 
TOTAL 126.7 146.1 137 .4 160.9 185.1 209.3 
Asia and Ocenia 
TOTAL 47.6 33.4 16.3 17 .6 10.9 11.9 
WORLD .TOTAL 1403.4 1268. l 1093.2 1365. 9 1566.2 1657.7 
1946 1947 1948 1949 
199.4 217 .4 217.2 258.6 
830 . 3 889 .8 1049.5 1162. 1 
339. 7 320.3 335.3 324.6 
1320.0 1252.5 1441.4 1520.4 
214. l 234.2 259.8 251.7 
14.7 11.4 18.4 19. 1 
1748.2 1715: 5. 1936.8 2049.8 
1950 
253.0 
890 .1 
268.3 
1198.3 
270.5 
28.4 
1750.2 
--.;I 
~ 
APPENDIX B-II (Continued) 
Continent or Country 1951 1952 1953 1954 1955 1956 1957 1958 1959 1960 1961 2 
North and Central 
America 
TOTAL 252.l 289.l 299.7 285.9 326.1 334.7 351.4 380.7 367.5 415.0 
South America 
Brazil 981.5 949.3 933.5 657.0 321.7 1008.3 859.2 772.9 1046.2 1009.1 1018 
Columbia 287.6 301.9 397.9 345.2 352.0 · 304.2 289.4 326.4 384.8 356.3 339 
TOTAL 1307 .2 1304.4 1398.8 1054.1 1234.9 1368.2 1218.1 1183.8 1505.4 1450.0 1357 
· Africa 
TOTAL 316.3 · 310. 7 324 .. 8 339.4 . 431.4 503.8 · 514.0 532. 7 . 581. l 665.-0 683 
Asia.and Ocenia 
TOTAL . 35.6 32 .. 8 · 45.? 59.7 38.3 75.8 . 76.3 49.0 62.3 62.0 109 
WORLD TOTAL 1911.2 1937.0 2069,5 1739. l 2030.7 2282 •. 5 2159.8 2146.2 2516.3 2592.0 2626. 
2FAO C~~<iity Review, 1966. Food and Agriculture Organization. o{ th~ United Nations, p. 111. 
. ~ 
Continent or Country 1962 
North and Central 
America 
TOTAL 
South America 
Brazil 982 
Columbia 394 
TOTAL 1736 
Africa 
TOTAL 749 
Asia and Ocenia 
TOTAL 90 
WORLD TOTAL 2757 
1963 
1171 
368 
1539 
760 
116 
2938 
APPENDIX B-II (Continued) _ 
1964 1965 
897 839 
385 350 
1282 1189 
857 830 
109 100 
2789 2640 
....., 
'W 
-., 
APPENDIX C-1 
PRICES {Cents Per Pound) . 
Calendar SPOT PRICES (N.Y.) 
Year Average Annual 
Brazil s2 Milds3 Robustas4 
1890 17 .9 
1891 16.7 
1892 14.3 
1893 17.2 
1894 16.5 
1895 15.9 
1896 12.3 
1897 7.9 
1898 6.3 
1899 6.0 
1900 8.2 
1901 6.5 
1902 5.9 
1903 5.6 
1904 7.8 
1905 8.J 
1906 8.1 
· 1907 6.6 
1908 6.3 
1909 7.8 
1910 9.5 
1911 13.4 
1912 14.6 
1913 . 11. l 
1914 8.2 
1915 7.5 
1916 ,9'{2 
1917 - 9.3 
1918 9.4 
1919 17.9 
1920 12.oa 21.5 
1921 10. 1 15.6 . 
1922 14.l 17.4 
1923 14.5 18~8 
1924 · 20.9 25.5 
1925 24.2 27.9 
1926 22. l 28.5 
1927 18.5 25.1 
1928 23.2 27.3 
1929 22.1 22.8 
74 · 
Calendar 
Year 
1930 
1931 
1932 
1933 
1934 
1935 
1936 
1937 
1938 
1939 
1940 
1941 
1942 
1943 
1944 
1945 
1946 
1947 
1948 
1949 
1950 
1951 
1952 
1953 
1954 
1955 
1956 
1957 
1958 
1959 
1960 
1961 
1962 
1963 
1964 
1965 
1966 
APPENDIX C-1 (Continued) 
SPOT PRICES {N.Y.) 
Average Annual 
Brazils 
13.2 
8.8 
10.7 
9.2 
11.2 
8.9 
9.3 
11.1 
7.8 
7.5 
7.2 
11.4 
13.4 
13.4 
13.4 
13.6 
18. 7 
26. 4 
27 . l 
32.8 
50.5 
54.2 
54.0 
57.9 
78.7 
57 .1 
58. l 
5~.9 
48.4 
37.0b 
36 .6 
36.3 
34.4 
34.5 
47.9 
42.0 
38.0 
Mi.1 ds 
18.0 
16.3 
11.9 
10.8 
14.3 
10.7 
11.0 
12.0 
11.0 
11.6 
8.3 
15.0 
15.9 
15.9 
15. 9 
15.9 
21.0 
30.1 
32.5 
37.4 
53.2 
58.7 
57. 0 
60.2 
80.0 
64.6 
74. 0 
63.9 
52.3 
45.2 
44.9a 
43.6 
40.9 
39.6 
48.8b 
Robustas 
17 .8 
18.9 
40.1 
46.8 
44.0 
47.6 
57.9 
38.4 
33.6 
34.6 
37.6 
28.7 
20.2 
18.5 
20.6 
27.9b 
35.6 
75 
1spot quotations are the cash prices offered per pound of coffee in 
the New York market for green coffee. 
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APPENDIX C-I (Continued 
2aB10 No. 7 {1890-1920}; from Wickizer, p. 240; bsantos No. 4 
(1920-1966); from F.A.O. #33, p. 73 (1921-1960); from Commodity Year Book 
1965: (1961-64) • · 
3aColumbian Man1zales · {1921-1960 from F.A.O. #33, p. 73; b{l961-64); 
from Co11111odityYear Book, 1965, p. 107. 
4a · · b 
Native Uganda No. 10 (1948-1960); from F~A.O. #33, p. 73; {1961-64); 
from Conunodity Year Boo."', 1965, p. 106. 
5aRetail washed (1920-41); from Wickizer, p. i:'.49. 
6From Annual Coffee Sta ti sti cs, 1964, p. 104. 
Year and Month 
1962 
1963 
1963 VII 
VIII 
IX 
X 
XI 
xn 
1964 I 
II 
III 
IV 
V 
VI 
VII 
VIII 
IX 
X 
XI 
XII 
1965 I 
II 
III 
nrri;;.11u.1A 1.,-.1.1 
COFFEE PRICES UNDER THE 62 AGREEMENT 
Santos No. 4 
Spot Price 
New York {cents/lb.) 
34.0 
34.l 
33.6 
32.7 
33.0 
35.0 
36.6 
37.4 
44.8 
46.3 
49.8. 
48.6 
47.4 
46.9 · 
46.6 
45.8 
45.0 
46.6 
46.9 
45.2 
45.2 
Columbian Manizales 
Spot Price 
New York {cents/lb.) 
40.8 
39.6 
39.6 
39.5 
39.4 
39.5 
39.6 
39,3 
45.0 
45.7 
50.0 
48.6 
49.3 
48.6 
49.3 
50.6 
50.0 
50.1 
49.9 
48.6 
48.9 
Ivory Coast Robusta 
Le Havre 
( F. franks/kg.) 
3.37 
3.08 
3.04 
3.02 
3.08 
3.09 
3.12 
3.22 
3.46 
3.56 
3.85 
4.03 
4.09 
4.18 
4.04 
4.04 
3.90 
3.82 
3.89 
3.77 
3.54 
3.38 
3.29 
Source: F.A.O. Monthly Bulletin of Agricultural Economics and Statistics, Vols. 13 (12),-14 (5). 
p. 51 and 42. 
;2;j 
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APPENDIX D 
AGREEMENT OBJECTIVES 
(1) To achieve a reasonable ba lanc0, betw~en supply ami dem:md on ~ bash 
which wit 1 assure adequate supplies of coffee to consumer.s and markets 
fot" coffee to producers at equitable pr1cest and which w111 bring 
about long-tenn equ111br1um between production and consumption; 
(2) To alleviate the serious hardship caused by burdensome surpluses 
and excessive fluctuations fa ::hr; prices of coffee to tho detriment 
of the interests of both product:rs and ~onsum€:rS; 
(3) To contribute to the development of productive resources and to 
tht:ll promotion and m~1ntr.mance of employment and income in the Member 
countries, thereby he 1 ping to bring about fair wages , higher 1i v1 ng 
standards, and better working conditions; 
(4) To assist in increasing the purchasing power of coffee-exporting 
countries by keeping prices at equitable levels and by increasing 
consumption; 
(5) To encourage the consumption of coffee by every possible means; and 
{6) In genernl, 1n recognftfon of the relationship of' the trade 1ncoffee 
to the ec.onomf c stability of markets for 1 ndustr1a 1 products, to 
further inter,national cooperation 1n connection with world coffee 
problems. "- ·. · 
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APPENDIX E 
INTERNATIONAL COFFEE AGREEMENT: MEMBERSHIP ANO DISTRIBUTION OF VOTES1 
34 Ex2ort1ng Members Votes 21 Im2ort1ng Members Votes 
Braztl 356 Argentina 
8urundt 8 Australia 11 
Colombia 122 Austria 12 
Congo (Leopo14v111e) 19 Belgium 33 
Costa Rica 24 Canada 42 
Cuba 9 Denmark 29 
Dom1n1can Republic 13 Federa 1 Repub 11 c 
Ecudor 16 of Germany 120 
El Salvador 33 Finland 25 
Ethfopia 28 France 118 
Ghana 6 Japan 13 
Guatemala 31 Luxembourg 6 
India 12 Netherlands 40 
Indonesia 38 New Ztaland 7 
Mexico 34 Norway 20 
Ntcarag~a 13 Spain 20 
N1ger1! Sweden 47 
OAMCAf · 89 Sw1tzerland4 
Panama 6 Tunisia 
Peru 16 United Kingdom 39 
Portugal 48 United States 400 
Rwanda 8 u.s.s.R. 18 
Sierra leona 6 
Tanzania 13 
Trinidad & Tobago 6 
Uganda 42 
Vene1u1l1 14 
TOTAL 1,000 TOTAL 1,000 
1Senate Committee on Finance, Coffee (Senate Report No. 53. Washington 
o.c.: 89th Congress 1st Session). p. 11. 
2 Nigeria. an exporting member. and Argentina and Tun1s1a, as importing 
members, have lost their votes for nonpayment of dues. 
30AMCAF members are Cameron; Central African Republic. Congo (Brazza-
ville); Dahomey; Gabon; Ivory Coast. Madagascar, and Togo. 
4swttzerland has just joined the Agreement. 
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Bralil 
Colabia 
Costa ltca 
Cuba 
Oomint.eea Republic 
Equador 
El Salvador 
Guatemala 
Hoitt 
Honduras 
Me>tico . 
Nicaragua 
Panama 
Peru 
Venauela 
C..roua 
Central Afrtan Re,ut>He 
Cf.mp (lra11avt11e.) 
Dahomey . 
&abort' 
lvor, toast 
Htla91sy ltipul)l1t . 
Togo· 
Kenya 
Uganda 
Tattten,1ki 
Portugal 
Congo (Leopolovn1eJ 
£tb1ppia 
India 
lAdontsia 
1111r11· 
· ,. llttanda aad iurvndf 
Sierra Leone 
Trtatdad 
YIUilA 
IUIW TOTAL. 
APPENDIX F 
IASlC iXPORT QUOTAS 
(60-Ki. log,ranue Sags) 
80 
QUOTA ACTlONS Of·THE INTERNATIONAL 
COFFEE COUNCIL 
19,6i..,f:i3 Coffee Year1 
l. Ocitober. 1962.: Annual quota& set at ,9 percent of the 
bas1e quotes for the first twrJ quarters of tht coffee year 
as stipulated in the tenns of the Agreement draft. 
I. March. l96!h Quotas for the retnain1ng two quarters of the 
coffee year set actording to each lltember'r; residual for the 
year a$ determined by the 99 percent fonnule. 
l963 ... fi4 Coffee Year2 
3,. August, 1963: Annual quota for 1963-64 set at 41.7 mi1Hrn1 
bags which continued to represent 99 pereen.t of the basic 
quotas set, forth 1 n · Annex A. of the AgreerAent. 
4. tiovernber. 1963: Proposal to increase ann~al quota by 2.25 
percent (lOl .. 25 percent of the basic quotas) defe1ted. 3 · . 
No waivers were granted. 
s. February. 1964~ Annual quota increased @ro rata, by 5% to 
47. 2 m11 Hon bags or 102. l 5 pereen.t of the basic qu.otas. 
The total of exnorts w1s further increased when waivers to 
sevtn cour1trtes' were granted add111g 948,llOO bags total 
to tt,eir quota al lottnents. The eooib1ne<.t increa$e$ ra1 sed 
the new global total to 48.1 niHHon bags .from the previous 
46.7 million bags allotted. 
6. l~ay, 1964;. Aojustn•nts in Ethiopia's an(i El Salvador's 
quotas rt.'i$ed c(Uotas by 0,.355 m11Hon bags. . Thus the final 
total for quotas in 1963 .. 64 was 48-4 11111110n bags. 
7. June. 1964; Shortfalls tota11ng 725,000 bags redistributed. 6 
1964·&5 Coffee Year 
( 
8. August, 1964: Annual export quotas set at 47 .5 m1111tn bags 
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(102.67 percent of basic quotas) with provisions for two 
supplemental increases of 0.5 million bags each on 
January 8, 1965. and again before April 30, 1965, depending 
on the condition of the market. Quarterly quotas were 
distributed as 24.7, 27.3, 24.0 and 24 percent. 
, 9. December,. 1964: Provision to increase quotas in January 
cancelled. 
10. January, 1965: . Producing members call for a 5 percent 
reduction in quota. 
11. February, 1965: Council approved a 4 percent reduction 
in the annual quota bringing it down by L9 million bags 
to 45.,6 million bags. . . 
12. March, 1965: Council granted waivers totaling 307,000 
bags (offset by a pro rata reduction of all quotas). 
Also a semi-automatic device tying quotas to a specified 
price range was adopted •. 
13. May, 1965: Quotas further reduced 4.5 percent of the 
yearly total for the remaining period of the 1964-65 
crop year by the Executive Board. This action reduced the 
yearly total of quo~s to 43.7 million bags. 
1965-66 Coffee Year 
14. August, 1965: Annual quota for 1965-6~ ,set at 43.7 million 
bags. It was also decided to effect no change in the 
indicator price range adopted 1n March, 1965, to set prices 
by. 
1Quotas for the first coffee year were specified in the draft of the 
Agreement to be fixed at 99 percent of the basic export quotas assigned 
to exporting members. The Internatiorial Coffee Council had not yet set 
up so it was left to the Board of the precursor short term International 
Coffee Agreement to carry out the above quota actions as established in 
paragraph 2 of Article 30 of the Agreement. 
2The first Session of the Council was held in Londo.n from July 29 
through August 24, 1963. Fifty-five countries. of wijteh 36 were exporters, 
were represented. · ·· 
laecause of increases in coffee prices that had occurred (see Appendix 
C), importing members and some acconrnodating exporting members, notably 
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Brazil, wanted an increase in quotas. A resolution was submitted to the 
Council calling for a iro rata increase in quotas from 99 percent of 
the basic quotas to 10~ .25 percent •.. This increase would have raised the 
global total from 45,732,622 to 46,771,663 bags. The resolution failed 
to gain the two-thirds distributed majority vote required to adjust · 
quotas. 
4Guatemala, Honduras, African and Malagasy Coffee Organization 
(OAMCAF), Peru, Portugal, Trinidad and Tobago, and Uganda. 
5The Council intreased Ethiopia 1 s basic quota by 155,000 bags on 
condition that it ratify the Agreement by June 30, 1964 and granted a 
waiver to El Salvador raising that country's quota for 1963-64 by 200,000 
bags. 
6 . 
11Shortfalls 11 are the amounts of quotas that members lack available 
supplies to fill. The countries are required by Article 33 to report 
these shortfa 11 s to the Counci 1 by the end of May. The Counei l then 
redistributes pro rata these amounts among the other members. 
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